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Currency Substitution in Selected African Countries 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This study investigates the presence of currency substitution in eight African countries- Egypt, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Tunisia and Zambia- for the period 1976 to 
2005 using both regional and US dollar as anchor currencies. We find that currency substitution 
is prevalent in Ghana and Nigeria when CFA franc is used as an anchor currency. However, 
when US dollar is used as an anchor currency there is no evidence of currency substitution in 
Ghana but we still observe the presence of currency substitution in Nigeria. Also we find 
presence of currency substitution in South Africa but not in Egypt when the US dollar is the 
anchor currency. For Kenya, Tunisia and Zambia there is no evidence of currency substitution 
irrespective of the anchor currencies considered. In the case of Morocco, we observe no evidence 
of currency substitution when the Egyptian pound is used as anchor currency but there is weak 
evidence of currency substitution when the US dollar is considered.  
 
JEL classification: E41; F32; C52 
Keywords : Currency substitution; money demand 
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1. Introduction 
 
  
 Currency substitution, in which foreign monies substitute for domestic money in its three 
traditional roles such as medium of exchange, unit of account and a store of value, makes 
execution of monetary and fiscal policy extremely difficult (Imrohoroglu, 1994; Calvo and Végh, 
1993; Niskanen, 2000;Giovannini and Turtleboom, 1992; Agénor & Khan, 1996; Rodriguez & 
Turner, 2003). A large number of factors make domestic residents substitute away from the 
domestic currency namely, the foreign trade transactions, the domestic transactions, the portfolio 
diversification, and the avoidance of excessive financial losses from inflationary taxation1 
(Brand, 1993).  In a country where currency substitution is prevalent interest rate (both real and 
nominal) changes would be uncertain due to the instability of the money demand. 
 Researchers examined the existence of currency substitutions and its adverse effects on 
policy making for both developed and underdeveloped countries2. Three distinct methods are 
used to identify the presence of currency substitution.  Thomas (1985) argued that the ratio of 
real domestic balances to real foreign balances should be negatively related to the domestic 
nominal interest rate and positively to the foreign nominal interest rate if currency substitution 
exists in those economies. Other researchers used optimizing framework with both domestic 
currency and foreign currency as assets to identify currency substitutions (Selçuk, 2003; Agénor 
& Khan, 1996). The presence of currency substitution has been also tested by examining the 
                                                 
1Dontsi (2001) adds a new security motive for African countries especially as fund deposits in European banks 
remain a safe haven for embezzled public funds and rents from illicit activities for African corrupt ruling clans. 
 
2 See currency substitution studies by Miles (1978, 1981), Bordo and Choudhri (1982), Imrohoroglu (1994) and He 
and Sharma (1997) for USA and Canada; Arize (1991), Tavlas & Ozeki (1992) and Sharma et.al., (2005) for Japan 
and South Korea; Artis et al. (1993), Mizen and Pentecost (1994), and Spencer (1997) for other European countries; 
Calvo and Végh (1993) for Bolivia, Peru, and Uruguay. Agénor and Khan (1996) found evidence of currency 
substitution in ten developing countries of Africa (Morocco, Nigeria), Asia (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Pakistan) and Latin America (Mexico, Brazil, and Ecuador). Selçuk (2003) and Buchs (2000) found 
existence of currency substitution in a number of Eastern European and Middle Eastern countries as well as Russia.  
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stability of the money demand function as the presence of currency substitution increases the 
volatility of money demand (Darrat et al., 1996; Sharma et al., 2004).   
The latter approach is the one considered in this paper. It is an indirect way of 
investigating the existence of currency substitution in a country by paying attention to the 
changes that take place in the money demand for domestic currency. We consider this approach 
because the data on foreign monies circulating in the economy and foreign deposits of domestic 
residents are not available for the countries considered here. Moreover, this approach has an 
advantage because it accounts for both capital mobility and currency substitution. Recently, 
Prock et al. (2003) investigated the presence of currency substitution in Latin America countries 
using this approach. They examined the money demand function of Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico in a vector error correction model. Their findings indicate that currency substitution is 
prevalent in all three countries, but it is more pronounced in Brazil and Argentina than in 
Mexico. Also, Darrat et al. (1996) examined the stability of money demand function for Japan 
while other researchers used a similar approach to study currency substitution in Asian 
developing countries (Sharma et al., 2004) and Mexico (Rodriguez and Turner, 2003).  
 The stability of the money demand function is crucial to conduct an efficient and 
independent monetary policy. Haug and Lucas (1996) used a co- integration analysis to study the 
stability of the Canadian long-run money demand. They also estimated the parameters with the 
fully-modified estimation method using quarterly data from 1953:1 to 1990:4, and observed a 
stable money demand function for Canada. Lutkepohl et al. (1999) studied the stability and 
linearity of a German money (M1) demand function. They used smooth transition regression 
techniques capable of accommodating both smooth and sudden change in regression coefficients 
over time. Using quarterly data from 1960:1 to 1995:4, they noted that the relationship was linear 
and stable before 1990 and the monetary unification barely changed this relationship. Ibrahim 
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(1998) using co-integration technique examined the stability of money demand in Malaysia by 
considering both M1 and M2 and observed that M1 is unstable in the long run, while M2 is 
stable in the long-run but unstable in the short-run. Consequently, he concludes that using M2 as 
a target in monetary policy will be recommended provided that the policy makers figure out the 
structural break in the money demand. There are only few studies devoted to money demand in 
African countries.  
 Generally researchers examine whether currency substitution exists between domestic 
currency and US dollar, British Pound, or Japanese Yen. However, countries with weaker trade 
ties to these rich countries along with underdeveloped foreign currency market might lead agents 
to substitute other regional currency that might make their money demand unstable. As African 
countries are moving towards a more market based monetary regimes, a crucial part of this 
framework is to understand the behavior of their money demand functions. But, only few studies 
have been devoted to investigate the money demand in African countries. Moreover, all these 
studies investigated the stability of money demand by using currency substitution between US 
dollar and domestic currency. In this paper, we investigate the existence of currency substitution 
in eight African countries: Ghana, Kenya, Tunisia, Zambia, South Africa, Morocco, Nigeria and 
Egypt by examining the stability of the money demand function in these countries using 
quarterly data from 1976:1 to 2005:4. Towards this goal both the US dollar and regional 
currencies are used as anchor currencies.  
 The extent of currency substitution could be determined with precision if one could get 
data on the quantity of foreign money with the public, the quantity of foreign money deposits in 
the domestic banking system and the amount of foreign currency deposits made abroad by 
domestic residents. However, the data on quantity of foreign money in circulation is not 
available even in developed countries. So applied researchers commonly use proxies like 
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expected change in depreciation of exchange rate to circumvent the data problem (see Prock et 
al., 2003; Elkhafif, 2003). 
 Our results indicate that there is no evidence of currency substitution in Kenya, Tunisia, 
and Zambia for both US dollar and regional currencies. However, for Ghana we observe that 
people substitute for CFA franc for their currency but not U.S. dollar. This means that if we take 
into account only the US dollar to examine the currency substitution we would have missed the 
presence of currency substitution in Ghana. We also note that Nigerians substitute both US dollar 
and CFA franc for their currency. This is quite possible since the rate of inflation in Nigeria is 
about 25%, so in order to protect the value of their liquidity Nigerians opted for substituting for 
foreign currencies. In Egypt and South Africa, we observe no evidence of currency substitution 
with respect to the US dollar. Morocco yields currency substitution when the US dollar serves as 
anchor but it is insignificant. On the other hand, when the Egyptian pound is used as anchor 
currency, Morocco yields no evidence of currency substitution.  
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we specify the model. Data descriptions 
are presented in section 3, while the results and the policy implications are discussed in section 4. 
At the end some concluding remarks are made. 
 
2. Monetary policies in Africa 
 African countries have adopted different monetary policies depending on whether 
or not a country was colonized by France or Great Britain. Honohan and O’Connell (1997) have 
identified 5 types of monetary regimes adopted by countries across Africa since the 1960s. First, 
we have a rule-based regime. The currency board system is defined as a set of rules preventing 
the exercise of discretion in most dimensions of central bank activity (see Honohan and 
O’Connell, 1997). For instance, in most of the British colonies (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Zambia, 
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among others) this system prevailed throughout the 1960s. On the other hand, in the French 
colonies (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, among others) 
a rule-based system with much more control from France was implemented. It simply pegged 
local currencies to the French national currency (the French Franc). As a result, monetary 
policies of these countries were almost entirely conducted by proxy by France throughout the 
1960s to the 1990s. Recently, these countries are conducting somewhat more independent 
monetary policies.  
The second form of monetary regime is the automatic monetary financing system. In this 
system, authorities make extensive use of deficit financing by issuing high-powered money to 
accommodate any macroeconomic shock. Fiscal deficits for ins tance are essentially financed 
through inflation tax. Countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Zambia (in the 1980s, 
1990s); Angola (in the 1990s) and Democratic Republic of Congo (from the 1970s to the 1990s) 
fit in this category. In other words, the quest for a controlled inflation is not a key objective of 
monetary decision-makers in these countries. As a result, these countries have experienced 
persistent inflation, or even hyperinflation.  
Third, there is the controlled economy regime or rationing regime. In these regimes, 
goods and exchange rates are rationed meaning that prices and quantities cannot fluctuate to 
clear markets. Authorities keep a tight control over the money supply. All shocks are 
accommodated through the establishment of rations. Thus, monetary policy in these economies is 
almost entirely passive or inactive. Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda among others implemented 
such regime in the 1970s; while other countries like Angola and Mozambique among others used 
it for a longer period throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  
Fourth, there is the monetary arrangement with credit ceiling. In this regime, commercial 
banks are limited in their ability to create money by the monetary authorities. Many African 
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countries have introduced this form of monetary arrangement starting in the 1980s (see for 
instance Killick and Mwega, 1990). Ethiopia, Malawi and Nigeria have had a monetary policy 
driven by credit ceiling from the 1970s to the 1980s. Others like Kenya, Zambia and Ghana 
among others have used this regime in the 1970s and 1980s, respectively.  
 Finally, we have market-clearing regimes. In these regimes, most of the decisions made 
by monetary authorities find their rationales through the forces of markets. They enjoy much 
more independence vis-à-vis the government and in the implementation of their policies. The 
government itself barely relies on expansionary monetary policies to offset the fiscal deficit. 
There is no preset credit ceiling as in the previous monetary arrangement: markets’ conditions 
dictate the creation of money by banks. This form of regime is not currently widely observed in 
Africa. However, as more and more African governments are becoming fiscally responsible and 
embracing the rules of good governance, we are witnessing a movement towards the 
establishment of independent central banks able to implement independent and market-based 
monetary policies. For example, Kenya has been implementing a market clearing approach since 
the 1980s and Ghana started in the 1990s.  
 
3. Model Specification and Methodology 
3.1 Model Specification 
 Bahmani-Oskooee and Techaratanachai (2001) note that most of the money demand 
functions present two basic characteristics. On the one hand, the broader definition of money 
(M2) is considered instead of M1, while exchange rate is included as a determinant of money 
holding besides income and the interest rate. With this fact in mind, we use a portfolio-balance 
model where agents in a given country may hold four types of assets: domestic currency, foreign 
currency, domestic bonds and foreign bonds. We note that the African countries considered in 
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this study have an insignificant securities market and these markets, when they exist, are 
accessible to a few financial institutions. Moreover, the issuance of bonds is not the primary 
channel for the governments to raise funds. Consequently, this study does not focus on domestic 
and foreign bonds equations which are overlooked in the portfolio. Money demand would 
depend on overall economic activities and also on the returns of the assets above.  
 Using a modified version of Darrat et al. (1996), we specify the following model:  
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æ is domestic real money demand, y is income, i is the domestic nominal interest 
rate, i* is the foreign interest rate, pe is the expected rate of inflation and ?ee is the expected 
change in the exchange rate.  
 As expected, income y represents a key determinant of real money demand in most of 
African countries since the average household maintains a sizeable  amount of domestic balances 
to pay for day to day expenses. Alternative instruments of payments such as checks are not very 
well developed as a few households have bank accounts. Moreover, distrust in these instruments 
has increased the reluctance of people to use them since many checks turn out to be fake or 
unfunded.3 As a result, we expect the partial derivative of real money balances with respect to 
transactions to be positive.  
 Despite the non-existence of well-developed financial markets, both nominal and foreign 
interest rates play a noticeable role in African countries in the determination of domestic 
balances for mainly two reasons. First, notwithstanding the fact that lots of households have little 
knowledge of the functioning of financial markets in terms of the opportunity cost for holding 
                                                 
3 For a detailed discussion see Dontsi (2001). 
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money, more and more educated people along with their involvement in the economic activities 
have come to understand the benefits for opening a saving or some sort of term accounts that 
bear interest. 
 The second reason is that many medium and big size corporations- which represent a 
substantial part of the demand for domestic real balances- are now extending their activities 
across borders to take advantage of the many opportunities available due to the proximity of 
important markets such as the WAEMU4 countries for Ghana and Nigeria, the South African 
economy for Kenya and Zambia, and the Egyptian economy for Morocco and Tunisia. As 
nominal interest rates are increasing, people will hold fewer domestic currency thereby decrease 
their demand for domestic real money. Thus, the expected signs of i is negative. 
 Inflationary expectations (pe) remain a key determinant of the quantity of real domestic 
balances as it erodes the value of nominal money holding. However, the source of this 
inflationary expectation is crucial for the relationship between inflationary expectation and 
money demand. The sign of the derivative of real money balances with respect to expected 
inflation would be negative if the expectation for an increase in prices is due to pure economic 
reasons. But if the dominant factor behind inflationary expectation is the political and social 
instability, we might observe a positive relationship between pe and money demand. As a matter 
of fact, during political instability of uncertain duration, the chain of supply of goods and 
services is either broken or weakened leading to a shortage and, ultimately, to a price increase. 
Also, people are aware of the fact that depository institutions (banks) will remain close during 
these times of instabilities and also people want to protect their unint errupted consumption level. 
Thus we expect the coefficient of pe to be positive.  
                                                 
4 It stands for West African Economic and Monetary Union that include 8 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
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  We can rewrite the money demand function, i.e. equation (1), in the following linearized 
form: 
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where ?1>0 and ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5 <0. Equation (2) is used for each country. 
 The real return of foreign bonds (essentially government’s bond) also determines the 
demand for real balances as it is another competing asset. The expected gains in exchange rate 
differential will add to the nominal return that will be received on a given foreign bond or 
interest bearing asset. That is, the real return on foreign bonds is the sum of i* and the expected 
change in the exchange rate ? ee:  
(i*+ ?ee)           (3) 
 Following the previous research and using (3) in equation (2), we obtain: 
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Moreover, there is a consensus in the literature concerning the fact that, with an increasingly 
integrated world coupled with a great deal of liberalization of both financial and goods markets, 
interest rates (foreign and domestic) vary to equalize each other5. This idea is well documented 
in Giddy (1983), Madura (1992), Francis et al. (2002) and Drakos (2003) in the context of 
developing countries and is known in the literature as the Interest Rate Parity argument. This 
equilibrium condition implies that:  
)( * eeii D+=                (5) 
Thus, the final form of the money demand function can be expressed in equation (6): 
                                                 
5  Although we have a distinct literature about home bias in asset holding, however, we believe that for African 
countries the home bias would not be pronounced. 
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 Equation (6) has a distinct advantage as we now excluded the foreign interest rate as a 
determinant of the domestic real money demand. This is good for modeling money demand for 
African countries as information on foreign interest is not widely available.  
The expected change in exchange rate (?ee) is used to identify the existence of currency 
substitution in this paper. A few studies conducted for African countries (Elkhafif, 2003; Agénor 
and Khan, 1996) essentially consider the US dollar as anchor currency. The present study departs 
from this approach by considering stable currencies of Africa such as the CFA6 franc as anchor 
in West Africa for Ghana and Nigeria; the South African Rand for Kenya and Zambia ; the 
Egyptian pound for Morocco and Tunisia in Northern Africa. This approach is realistic because 
of the proximity of these blocs of countries with respect to the anchor currency economy due to 
the convenience for domestic agents and the increasing level of exchanges that are being 
conducted among these countries. Finally, the US dollar is used as anchor for Egypt and South 
Africa as they serve themselves as anchor for other countries. A significant negative coefficient 
of the expected fluctuations in exchange rates will identify the existence of currency substitution 
(Bordo and Choudhri, 1982). As a matter of fact, a negative sign associated with expected 
changes in exchange rates will indicate that economic agents are reducing their holding of real 
domestic balances as a depreciation of the domestic currency is anticipated. In other words, they 
shy away from the domestic currency and substitute it with the anchor currency that is 
appreciating. People adjust their holdings of real domestic balances by substituting foreign 
currency (the anchor currency) for domestic currency as the domestic cur rency is expected to 
                                                 
6 C.F.A. is a French acronym that stands for “Communauté Financière Africaine” or African Financial Community.  
It’s a group of 8 countries in Western Africa. The countries part of the C.F.A. are, in alphabetical order, Benin, 
Burkina-Faso, Côte D’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. They use a common currency called 
“Franc C.F.A.” or C.F.A. Franc in English. This currency is tied to the Euro through the French Franc. 
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depreciate. We will estimate equation (6) for each of these African countries. A negative and 
significant 4g  will indicate the presence of currency substitution in a country.  
 
3. Data  
We collected quarterly data for Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Tunisia, and Zambia for the period 1976 to 2005 from the International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) published by the IMF. We considered this time period as floating/managed floating 
exchange rate regimes in these countries would allow us to identify currency substitution by 
examining the stability of the money demand function using expected depreciation of the 
exchange rate as a proxy. For each count ry, we collected data on the domestic real money 
demand ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
P
M 2 7; the real Gross National Income (y); the domestic deposit interest rate (i); 
expected inflation rate, pe, measured by the change in the actual rate of inflation, i.e. ?p; and the 
expected depreciation in the exchange rate with respect to the anchor country approximated by 
the inflation differential between the domestic country considered and the anchor currency 
country. This also allows us to avoid econometric problems related to pegged and managed 
exchange rates. 
 
4. Results and Policy Implications  
 Most of the studies in currency substitution examine whether people in a country hold 
foreign currencies of developed countries like US Dollar, British Pound, or Japanese Yen. 
However, we examine whether people of these African countrie s hold some regional currencies.  
                                                 
7 Inflation is measured as the percentage change in the consumer price index in all countries but for Tunisia and 
Zambia it is measured by the percentage change in the GDP deflator. 
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In addition to this, we examine whether they hold US Dollar in their portfolio. The home 
currency and anchor currencies for each country are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Home and Anchor Currencies 
 
Country Home Currency Anchor Currency 
Egypt Pound US Dollar 
Ghana New Cedi CFA Franc 
Kenya Shilling South Africa Rand 
Morocco Dirham Egyptian Pound 
Nigeria Naira CFA Franc 
South Africa Rand US Dollar 
Tunisia Dinar Egyptian Pound 
Zambia Kwacha South Africa Rand 
 
Prior to the estimation of model (6), we need to check the stationarity of each series used here. 
Thus, to test whether the series are stationary or not a variety of unit root tests are performed.  
 
4. 1. Unit Root Tests 
As low power of different tests for unit roots is a recurrent issue and the lack of 
consensus in the literature about the most appropriate tests, we use 12 different tests on level and 
first difference for each series8. These are Dickey-Fuller tests, Augmented Dickey-Fuller and 
different variations of Phillips-Perron tests. Regardless of the country considered, we fail to 
reject the unit root hypothesis for the log of real money balances (ln m2) and the log of real GDP 
(ln yt) except for Egypt in the latter case. These findings are similar with the different variables 
representing interest rates (i). That is, three-month time deposit (Egypt, Morocco and Nigeria), 
Treasury bill rate (Ghana, Kenya and South Africa), three-six month time deposit (Tunisia and 
Zambia) are found to be non-stationary in levels. Inflation differential (?pt) within all countries 
                                                 
8 To save space the results of unit root tests are not reported but are available from the authors. 
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are found to be stationary, except in Nigeria and Zambia. On the other hand, results indicate that 
inflation differential (?p*t) between the countries considered and their respective anchor country 
are non-stationary for all countries except Morocco. As a summary, we have a combination of 
I(0) and I(1) variables in the money demand equation of each country. For Egypt, ln(m2), i, and 
? p*t are I(1) whereas ln (y) and ?pt are I(0). For Ghana, ln (m2), ln (y), i and ?p*t are I(1), and 
? pt  is I(0); for Kenya, Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia, ln(m2), ln(y), i and ?p*t are I(1) while 
? pt  is I(0); and for Nigeria and Zambia ln(m2), ln(y), i, ?pt and ?p*t are all I(1).  
 
4. 2.  Long-run Analysis 
 We investigate the existence of a long-run relationship between real money balances, real 
income, interest rate, expected inflation and expected exchange rate depreciation. In Table 2, we 
report the ?-max and ?-trace statistics proposed by Johansen and Juselius (1990) to test9 for co-
integration in all eight countries. The existence of at least one co- integration vector suggest that 
the variables considered move towards an equilibrium in the long-run. Both ?-trace and ?-max 
test statistics reveal that there are two co- integrating vectors in the case of Morocco and Nigeria  
and three and four co- integrating vectors for Egypt and South Africa, respectively. As a matter of 
fact, ?-max indicates two co- integrating vectors in the case of Ghana, Tunisia and Zambia, 
whereas ?-trace indicates just one for Tunisia and Zambia, and three co-integrating vectors for 
Ghana. As far as Kenya is concerned, ?-trace indicates three co-integrating vectors, when ?-max 
indicates no co- integrating vector. However, for all countries there exists at least one co-
integrating vector which in turn means that the relationship between money demand and its 
                                                 
9 A variety of Johansen and Juselius (1990) tests were used and all, except in a few cases, find the same number of 
co-integrating vector as mentioned above.  
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determinants holds in the long-run. Intercepts is tested in each co- integrating vector by using the 
likelihood ratio statistics10. Except for Egypt intercept is significant for all countries. 
Table 2 
?-trace and ?-max Test statistics  
      Number of cointegrating vectors 
             
Country Test statistic     r = 0    r = 1     r = 2    r = 3    r = 4 
Egypt ?- Trace  154.636 75.076 33.712 10.981 0.155 
p=3 ?- Max 79.559 41.364 22.731 10.826 0.155 
Ghana ?- Trace  137.066 67.053 31.288 11.471 5.148 
p=3 ?- Max 70.012 35.766 19.817 6.323 5.148 
Kenya ?- Trace  93.469 60.590 31.256 8.971 1.297 
p=8 ?- Max 32.879 29.333 22.285 7.675 1.297 
Morocco ?- Trace  104.981 48.127 20.219 9.192 0.313 
p=4 ?- Max 56.854 27.908 11.027 8.879 0.313 
Nigeria ?- Trace  113.281 64.735 21.436 9.538 0.396 
p=5 ?- Max 48.546 43.299 11.897 9.142 0.396 
South Africa* ?- Trace  143.383 91.202 51.524 31.185 11.725 
p=8 ?- Max 52.181 39.678 20.339 19.461 11.725 
Tunisia ?- Trace  79.689 41.806 13.873 4.283 1.479 
p=3  ?- Max 37.882 27.933 9.590 2.804 1.479 
Zambia ?- Trace  116.707 44.664 16.492 3.815 0.478 
p=3 ?- Max 72.042 28.172 12.677 3.337 0.478 
       
5% Critical values:  ?- Trace  69.819 47.856 29.797 15.495 3.841 
 ?- Max 33.877 27.584 21.132 14.265 3.841 
       
5% Critical values*:  ?- Trace  88.804 63.876 42.915 25.872 12.518 
 ?- Max 38.331 32.118 25.823 19.387 12.518 
       
       
p is the number of lags suggested by AIC     
 
These results validate our model in Equation (6). We then examine the significance levels of 
these coefficients. A significant coefficient of the expected exchange rate depreciations in co-
integrating vectors indicates the instability of the money demand function and the existence of 
currency substitution. The normalized co- integrating vector with the highest eigen value is 
discussed next for each country.  
                                                 
10 The LR statistics to test the significance of intercept for each country is given in parentheses next, i.e. Egypt (-
1.91), Ghana (-33.09), Kenya (14.98), Morocco (-29.41), Nigeria (-7.32), South Africa (-19.85), Tunisia (-46.21) 
and Zambia (-96.02).  
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Egypt 
The normalized co- integrating vector corresponding to the highest eigen value is: 
m2 = 1.858yt + 0.049it + 0.118pet + 0.032?eet  
                     (33.93*)     (6.33*)    (4.33*)        (10.57*) 
 
We find no evidence of currency substitution with respect to the U.S. dollar as g4 is positive and 
highly significant 11. These findings suggest that real money demand in Egypt is stable. This is 
contrary to the findings of Elkhafif (2003) who finds supporting evidence of currency 
substitution in Egypt using an error-correction model. In his work, currency substitution is 
approximated by the ratio of foreign currency deposits in commercial banks over money supply. 
The difference in his and this study may come from the fact that Elkhafif (2003) consider annual 
data for a shorter period from 1991 to 2001. Indeed, during this period Egypt experienced an 
increase in foreign currency deposits into her banking system, which could explain why he finds 
strong evidence of currency substitution.  
To further our understanding of the money demand function in Egypt, we derive the 
impulse response functions (IRFs)12 and the variance decomposition functions (VDF)13. In Figure 
1(a), results indicate that innovations in deposit rate have a positive impact on the real money 
balances. This impact decreases throughout the 15th period where it remains constant until the 
40th period. Similarly, innovations in expected changes in the exchange rates have a long-term 
positive effect on the real money demand and it remains persistent till the 40th period. Also, 
shocks in expected change in exchange rates are positive but remain negligible and remain 
smaller than the effects of innovations in money demand and real output. Shocks to domestic 
deposit rate are initially positive until the 15th period before becoming negative for the remaining 
                                                 
11 t-statistics are in parentheses. A sign (*) denotes significance at the 5% level.  
12 IRFs for all countries are reported in the Appendix to this paper. 
13Variance Decomposition results are reported in Table 3.  
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of the periods. Disturbances in expected inflation essentially have negative effects on money 
demand. These effects persist although with a low intensity. In addition, all these responses are 
within a 95% confidence interval. This indicates that our model performs well in describing the 
behavior the real money demand function. On the other hand, the VDF show that the variations 
in the domestic real balances are essentially determined by fluctuations in real output that 
accounts for about 60% of variations in real demand. Consequently, we believe that Egypt 
should design her monetary policy focusing mainly on domestic factors such as real output.  
 
Ghana 
The final model for Ghana is given by:  
 m2 =  0.010 + 0.909yt – 0.027it – 0.430pet – 0.119?eet   
                    (0.004)  (0.62)     (-0.71)       (-4.78*)     (-6.83*) 
 
We note that the coefficient for expected depreciation of exchange rate is negative and highly 
significant. This indicates currency substitution between the Ghanaian Cedi and the C.F.A. franc, 
which has effects on the money demand function. Monetary authorities cannot operate an 
independent monetary policy as external variables have significant influence on the money 
demand. Therefore, they should implement policies that take into account evolution into 
economies of countries using the CFA franc. People of Ghana find the use the CFA franc in 
conducting their transactions profitable. This is probably due to the fact that Ghana has borders 
with the CFA Franc countries. Also the average inflation of 35% in Ghana would encourage 
people to hold a more stable cur rency. Bank of Ghana should ensure that domestic inflation does 
not diverge a great deal from the inflation rate of economies using the CFA franc.  
Moreover, IRFs in Figure 1(b) reveal that innovations in expected inflation and expected 
change in exchange rate create a negative and persistent effect on money demand throughout 
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from the short-run till the long-run. Innovations in both real output and T-bill rate positively 
affect the domestic real money demand from the 4th quarter onward with about the same 
magnitude. However, these impacts are virtually insignificant in the short-run up to the 3rd 
quarter. The response is even negative for a little while following innovation in T-bill rate. The 
effects of these shocks remain significant throughout the period considered with a confidence 
interval of roughly 95 percent. Furthermore, it is found through the VDF that the real income 
roughly generates 34 percent of fluctuations in the real money demand, whereas expected 
changes in real exchange rate account for 6 percent. Although generating only about 12 percent 
of changes in real money demand, T-bill rate remains an important factor responsible for 
fluctuations in real money demand. On the other hand, when we consider the sample period 
1981:1 to 2005:4 using the US dollar as anchor currency, we note that there is no evidence 
currency substitution between the Ghanaian Cedi and the US dollar14.  
 
Kenya 
The normalized money demand function for Kenya is: 
 m2 =    -0.992 +  2.032yt – 0.0381it – 0.398pet + 0.078?eet 
                        (-1.42)     (3.96*)     (-3.07*)      (-1.93)       (4.47*) 
 
We find no evidence of currency substitution between the Kenyan Shilling and the South African 
Rand. Thus, our findings suggest that the money demand in Kenya is stable. Monetary 
authorities may therefore efficiently pursue an independent monetary policy. 
 The response of real money demand to a one standard deviation shocks are shown in 
Figure 1c. The response to expected inflation is negative at first up to the 9th quarter where it 
becomes positive and significant for the remaining of the time period considered. Innovations in 
                                                 
14 See Appendix Table A1. The US dollar is used as anchor currency for the period 1981-2005 for all other 
countries, besides Egypt and South Africa. 
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expected inflation generate the most significant response of m2. Innovations in other variables-
expected change in exchange rate and real output- have less impact on real money demand. For 
instance, real money demand responds positively at first by reaching a peak around the 6th 
quarter before dying out in the 16th quarter. Expected changes in exchange rates and T-bill rate 
disturbances mostly remain insignificant from the short-run to the long run. Another finding in 
Figure 1(c) is that the shocks to real money demand yields the highest response of real money 
demand itself and findings are within a 95 percent confidence interval throughout the 40th 
quarter. Our variance decomposition results reveal that besides real money demand, real output 
and expected inflation together account for about 30 percent of fluctuations in real money 
demand with real GDP accounting for about 17 percent. Accordingly, special attention should be 
paid by decision-makers to both real GDP and expected inflation rate in any attempt to control 
the real money demand. In addition, using the sample 1981:1 to 2005:5 we find that there is no 
evidence of currency substitution between the shilling and the US dollar. This is another 
indication that the money demand is more stable in Kenya. 
 
Morocco 
The estimated money demand function for Morocco is: 
  m2 =  -2.051 + 1.971yt + 0.045it + 0.442pet + 0.028?eet 
           (-3.57*)   (11.46*)    (1.56)    (7.30*)        (3.05*) 
 
We find no evidence of currency substitution in Morocco meaning people of Morocco do not 
substitute their Dirham for Egyptian pound.  However, real money demand responds negatively 
to time deposit rate until the 25th quarter as shown in Figure 1(d). Real GDP disturbances lead to 
positive and significant response of real money demand from the first period onwards. These 
findings support the evidence that domestic factors are more important in determining the real 
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money demand. Moreover, variance decomposition results reveal that almost 30 percent of 
fluctuations in real money demand are explained by changes in real output in the long run. 
Innovations in expected inflation and expected changes in exchange rate remain insignificant, 
while innovations to real money demand generate considerable response from real money 
demand. This finding is confirmed by the VDC that shows that almost 66 percent, of fluctuations 
in real money demand are generated by fluctuations in real money demand. External factors are 
completely negligible as they account for less than 2 percent of variations in real money demand. 
 Using data from 1981:1 to 2005:4 and the US dollar as anchor currency, we find that the 
money demand function is relatively stable as there is weak evidence of currency substitution 
between the dirham and the US dollar. In other words, people in Morocco substitute the US 
dollar for the Dirham but this substitution is not significant enough to noticeably affect the 
destabilize the money demand function.   
 
 Nigeria 
The estimated long-run money demand model for Nigeria is: 
  m2 =  0.097 + 0.692yt –0.0000 97it + 0.388pet – 0.027?eet 
                                     (0.11)    (1.80)       (-0.003)      (6.37*)       (-2.67*) 
 
This money demand function indicates that there is evidence of currency substitution in Nigeria 
between the Naira and the CFA Franc. Consequently, an independent monetary policy cannot be 
designed for Nigeria since the real money demand appears to be unstable. So Nigerian central 
bank should pay a great deal of attention to economic fluctuations in surrounding Western 
African countries that use the CFA Franc. We also find the existence of currency substitution in 
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Nigeria when the US dollar is used as anchor currency15. Figure 1(e) shows that the response of 
real money demand to real GDP and it remains positive, steady, and significant over time. On the 
other hand, the response of real money demand to expected inflation shocks remains negative 
and significant throughout the 40th period. However, innovations in time deposit rate and 
expected change in exchange rates have negligible effects on real money demand throughout the 
long run. Moreover, VDF shows that domestic inflationary expectations are responsible for most, 
about 30 percent, of the fluctuations in real money demand.  
 
South Africa 
The estimated long-run money demand function for South Africa is as follows: 
 m2 =  -0.96 +   3.255yt – 0.00065it + 0.355pet – 0.0205? eet 
                    (-2.61*)    (10.9*)     (-0.12)        (6.34*)         (- 4.18*) 
 
 
This indicates that currency substitution exists in South Africa. It also suggests that the money 
demand function is unstable and monetary policy makers in South Africa should put more 
emphasis on the external factors16.  
In Figure 1(f), it appears that the response of real money demand to innovations in real 
output is positive till the 10th period although insignificant. At that point in time, the response is 
negative but insignificant up to the 40th period. On the other hand, innovations in domestic 
inflationary expectations remain insignificant throughout the short-run and long run. Both 
innovations in T-bill rate and change in expected exchange rate yields a negative response of real 
money demand that persists over time till the 40th quarter. Disturbances in real money demand 
remain positive but insignificant throughout any time period considered. However, the VDF 
                                                 
15 Calvo and Végh (1992), and Agénor and Khan (1996) used the US dollar as anchor currency and find evidence of 
currency substitution in Nigeria. 
16 Elkhafif (2003) finds evidence of currency substitution in South Africa by using an error-correction model for the 
period ranging from 1991 to 2001. 
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results show that the expected change in exchange rate dictates most of the variations in real 
money demand (accounts for more than 45 percent). In addition, it indicates that monetary 
authorities should pay a great deal of attention to the changes in the US economy. Other factors 
like the T-bill rate also account for almost 30 percent of fluctuations in real money demand, 
which confirms the importance of the T-bill rate in determining the real money demand.  
 In the case of South Africa, authorities should consider targeting exchange rate between 
the US dollar and the rand because of the significance of currency substitution. As a matter of 
fact, it is true that in recent years the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has devoted most of 
its efforts targeting the consumer Price index for Metropolitan and urban areas (CPXI) inflation 
for the past years within a monthly target range of 3-6 percent after a peak of 11.3 percent in 
November of 2002. Yet, considering the finding of this study, monetary authorities should also 
consider implementing policies destined to stabilize the exchange rate between the US dollar and 
the rand. This will in turn contribute to a more stable money function demand, which is crucial to 
achieving high employment and economic development. 
 
Tunisia 
The estimated money demand function for Tunisia is as follows: 
 m2 =  -0.615 + 1.342yt – 0.038it + 0.673pet + 0.002?eet 
                      (-1.34)  (4.62*)    (-0.46)     (5.55*)        (0.16) 
 
 
This implies that there is no evidence of currency substitution in Tunisia The Banque Centrale 
de Tunisie (BCT) has clearly defined its goals of targeting inflation to maintain the value of the 
Dinar both domestically and internationally.  
 According to Figure 1(g), a shock to the real GDP leads to a positive response of real 
money demand that is significant and grow persistently over time. However, disturbances in time 
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deposit are at first positive and become negative after one year throughout the long-term. These 
disturbances remain insignificant over the long run. Real money demand shocks are positive 
throughout the long-run but largely remain insignificant, while shocks in expected changes in 
exchange rate produce no effects whatsoever on real money demand confirming once more the 
stability of the money demand in Tunisia. Variance Decomposition Functions indicate that real 
GDP and domestic interest rate largely determine the fluctuations in real money demand in 
Tunisia. Indeed, real GDP and domestic interest rate account for roughly 36 and 12 percent 
respectively, of movements in real money demand. Innovations in real demand account for about 
50 percent of variations in real money demand. 
 Similarly, we have no evidence of currency substitution when we consider the US dollar 
as the anchor currency for the period ranging from 1981:1 to 2005:4. These results indicate that 
the money demand in Tunisia is fairly stable.  
 
Zambia 
For Zambia, we estimate the following money demand function: 
 m2 =  -676.9488 +  0.0277yt + 0.0034it + 0.00324pet + 2.35E-09? eet 
           (-2.39*)           (0.03)     (1.86)       (0.002)            (1.23) 
 
These results indicate that currency substitution is not significant in Zambia. People of Zambia 
do not substitute their domestic currency for the South African Rand. A stable real money 
demand in Zambia allows authorities to have an independent monetary policy. Impulse response 
functions in Figure 1(h) shows that the responses of real money demand to real output, deposit 
rate and expected change in exchange rate shocks are completely negligible. Only innovations in 
domestic inflationary expectations generate a negative response of real money until the 10th 
quarter and dye out afterwards in the long run. Also, disturbances in real money demand 
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generate at first the most significant response in real money demand but it sharply declines 
throughout the long run. The VDF confirms that domestic factors, namely the domestic 
inflationary expectations and domestic interest rates the driving force behind fluctuations in real 
money demand as they both account for about 45 percent of variations in real money demand, 
while real money itself accounts for 50 percent. When we use the US dollar as anchor currency 
we still find that there is no currency substitution between Kwacha and US dollar.  
 
5. Conclusion  
In this paper we examine the existence of currency substitution in eight African countries. 
We know that currency substitution by making money demand function unstable makes 
monetary policy making difficult. Using a portfolio balance model we estimate money demand 
functions where expected depreciation rate of the exchange rate is an explanatory variable. A 
significant negative coefficient for this expected depreciation rate of the exchange rate would 
indicate the presence of currency substitution. We examined currency substitutions related to 
regional currency and we find the existence of currency substitution in three countries- namely, 
Ghana (Anchor Currency: CFA Franc), Nigeria (Anchor Currency: CFA Franc) and South Africa 
(Anchor Currency: US Dollar). We also estimated the money demand function using the US 
dollar as anchor currency for all countries using data from 1981:1 to 2005:4. We find that 
currency substitution exists in Nigeria but we find no currency substitution in Ghana. Also for 
Morocco we find weak evidence of currency substitution when US Dollar is the anchor currency. 
These results indicate that we need to be careful about choice of anchor currency when we are 
conducting analysis related to currency substitution.  
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Table 3.  Variance Decomposition Functions 
Country Period             m2t      y t           it           pet           ? eet 
   1  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
   4  92.97761  0.975980  4.810015  0.281939  0.954458 
Egypt  8  87.94814  4.953059  5.175104  0.205946  1.717749 
   16  67.34911  27.66516  3.144908  0.423662  1.417159 
   20  58.37268  37.38439  2.538068  0.455588  1.249268 
   1  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
   4  89.57480  1.574020  0.101239  7.083936  1.666011 
Ghana  8  87.24964  1.916673  1.319191  6.546448  2.968047 
   16  76.31614  8.500240  5.118946  6.476387  3.588284 
   20  69.14322  13.03569  6.519295  7.076805  4.224988 
   1  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
   4  79.39958  9.870534  4.894703  3.840717  1.994464 
Kenya  8  55.92893  35.49093  4.973468  2.452012  1.154655 
   16  56.21587  30.13922  3.851435  8.026400  1.767073 
   20  60.28929  25.77762  3.567978  8.297655  2.067456 
   1  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
   4  76.33791  12.19832  6.392333  0.641469  4.429969 
Morocco  8  73.88648  14.28782  4.600800  0.515510  6.709389 
   16  70.09305  21.51237  3.993681  0.287681  4.113211 
   20  69.49976  23.44587  3.385523  0.244478  3.424368 
   1  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
   4  83.10610  3.938745  2.274429  10.41252  0.268210 
Nigeria  8  56.66596  13.58147  9.461708  20.09305  0.197808 
   16  37.73986  25.71082  7.563934  28.86273  0.122660 
   20  32.62684  30.57514  6.667654  30.01351  0.116857 
   1  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
   4  87.81662  1.410677  4.332827  1.443700  4.996178 
South Africa  8  66.24894  0.855775  8.683572  2.069071  22.14265 
   16  31.76269  0.639697  31.41110  1.717584  34.46893 
   20  24.02173  0.886494  32.77252  1.347099  40.97216 
   1  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
   4  90.69525  5.491330  0.496211  3.246833  0.070379 
Tunisia  8  85.81170  11.21174  0.523892  2.384018  0.068650 
   16  74.77071  21.78406  1.855041  1.541747  0.048440 
   20  69.52326  25.96669  3.091045  1.378024  0.040981 
   1  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
   4  82.62120  1.176578  3.593366  12.43451  0.174339 
Zambia  8  64.65337  3.954204  9.993803  21.28359  0.115029 
   16  54.63525  5.390561  12.04138  27.73643  0.196375 
   20  53.09112  5.242031  12.66429  28.81622  0.186340 
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Figure 1.  Impulse-Response Functions 
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(b) Ghana 
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(c) Kenya 
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(d) Morocco 
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(e) Nigeria 
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(f) South Africa 
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(g) Tunisia 
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(h) Zambia 
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Appendix Table A1 
Normalized Cointegrating Vectors: The Anchor Currency is US Dollar  
  
      Variables     
Countries   m2 y i pe ? ee 
Ghana   1 -7.679 0.0990 -7.5440 
-0.1884 
(-44.01*) 
Kenya   1 -8.565 0.0541 5.1068 
-0.0519 
(-0.91) 
Morocco   1 -2.587 -0.0213 1.0314 
0.0576 
(1.75) 
Nigeria   1 -0.033 -0.0468 0.8697 
0.0314 
(4.86*) 
Tunisia   1 -0.435 1.1058 -3.9735 
-0.0157 
(-0.24) 
Zambia   1 -7.167 0.0100 0.0157 
-0.0043 
(-1.49) 
 
Note: For consistency in our results and analysis, we follow the same specifications as the ones  
used in determining the number of cointegrating vectors. To save space, we have reported 
vectors that make economic sense. 
(*) denotes significance at the 5 percent level.  
 
 
 
 
